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II—RESEMBLANCE NOMINALISM, CONJUNCTIONS 
AND TRUTHMAKERS
GONZALO RODRIGUEZ-PEREYRA
The resemblance nominalist says that the truthmaker of ?Socrates is white?
ultimately involves only concrete particulars that resemble each other. Fur-
thermore he also says that Socrates and Plato are the truthmakers of?Socrates resembles Plato?, and Socrates and Aristotle those of ?Socrates
resembles Aristotle?. But this, combined with a principle about the truth-
makers of conjunctions, leads to the apparently implausible conclusion
that ?Socrates resembles Plato and Socrates resembles Aristotle? and?Socrates resembles Plato and Plato resembles Aristotle? have the same
truthmakers, namely, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. I shall argue that the re-
semblance nominalist can say that those conjunctions have the same truth-
makers but these truthmakers make them true in different ways. I shall also
use this view to account for the truthmakers of propositions like ?Socrates
is white?, and respond to previous objections by Cian Dorr and Jessica
Wilson.
I
Resemblance nominalism is a theory according to which there are
no universals and no tropes. What theories of universals and tropes
explain by invoking universals and tropes, resemblance nominalism
explains by invoking resembling particulars and sets, but sets, al-
though abstract, are particular nevertheless. (Thus resemblance
nominalism is nominalism in the traditional sense of the word, in
that it rejects universals, not in the modern sense of the word, ac-
cording to which nominalism entails the rejection of abstract ob-
jects.)
What does resemblance nominalism explain? Resemblance nomi-
nalism, and its competitor theories, trope theory and realism about
universals, are solutions to the problem of universals. This problem
is a problem about truthmakers, namely, to account for the truth-
maker of propositions attributing a feature or characteristic to a par-
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ticular thing, propositions like ?Socrates is white?.1 In a nutshell, the
realist about universals says that the truthmakers for propositions
like ?Socrates is white? will involve a universal, the universal of
whiteness. The trope theorist says that such a truthmaker will in-
volve a trope, a white trope specifically. And the resemblance nomi-
nalist says that the truthmaker ultimately involves only concrete
particulars, that is, particulars like Socrates and Plato, that resemble
each other. Thus in my Resemblance Nominalism (Rodriguez-
Pereyra 2002) I defended a view according to which what makes?Socrates is white? true is the fact that Socrates is white, where this
fact is the conjunctive fact whose conjuncts are resemblance facts be-
tween Socrates and each one of the white particulars, and where the
constituents of any resemblance fact between Socrates and a white
particular are Socrates and the white particulars in question.2 Thus,
if we suppose that Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are the only white
particulars, [Socrates is white] is [Socrates resembles Plato and Soc-
rates resembles Aristotle].3 But consider propositions (1) and (2):
1 For reasons of space, I cannot defend here the claim that the problem of universals is a
problem about truthmakers (for a defence of this claim see Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002,
pp. 26–30). In this paper, as is now standard, I use angled brackets to designate proposi-
tions. And I shall use square brackets to designate facts. Thus ‘?P?’ stands for the proposi-
tion that P and ‘[P]’ stands for the fact that P.
2 Thus facts are consistent with resemblance nominalism and therefore with nominalism,
for complex facts have simpler facts as constituents, and simple facts have concrete partic-
ulars as their sole constituents (note also that no universals or tropes of resemblance are
needed as constituents of resemblance facts). Thus facts need not be understood as they nor-
mally are, that is, as complex entities composed of particulars and universals. But note that
even on this way of conceiving facts, facts obey a non-mereological mode of composition:
thus although the only basic constituents of [Socrates resembles Plato and Socrates resem-
bles Aristotle] are Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, this fact is not the sum Socrates + Plato +
Aristotle. Some philosophers, David Lewis for instance, believe that the only mode of com-
position is mereological composition (Lewis 1986, p. 92). But the doctrine that mereology
is the only mode of composition is more a dogma than anything else. Indeed, many philos-
ophers have argued that there is non-mereological composition (Armstrong 1986, p. 85;
Armstrong 1997, p. 118; Forrest 1986, p. 89).
3 Strictly speaking, my view in Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002) was that, supposing that all and
only white things are Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, [Socrates is white] is the conjunctive fact
[Socrates resembles Socrates and Socrates resembles Plato and Socrates resembles Aristotle].
But I shall speak as if the view was that it is the fact [Socrates resembles Plato and Socrates
resembles Aristotle]. This is because it simplifies exposition, and because I have started to
toy with the idea that self-resemblance cannot be even part of what makes, say, a white par-
ticular white. But this change will not affect my discussion, in §iii, of Dorr’s and Wilson’s
objections to the doctrines expressed in Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002)—these objections are
independent of whether self-resemblance plays any role in what makes an F thing F, and
what I will say there about their objections will apply even if self-resemblance plays such a
role and the fact [Socrates is white] is a fact like [Socrates resembles Socrates and Socrates
resembles Plato and Socrates resembles Aristotle].
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(1) ?Socrates resembles Plato and Socrates resembles Aristotle?
(2) ?Socrates resembles Plato and Plato resembles Aristotle?
My view was that conjunctions were jointly or collectively made
true by the truthmakers of the conjuncts (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002,
pp. 38–9). So what about the truthmakers of (3), (4) and (5)?
(3) ?Socrates resembles Plato?
(4) ?Socrates resembles Aristotle?
(5) ?Plato resembles Aristotle?
My answer in the book was that the truthmakers of true proposi-
tions asserting resemblance between two particulars are the resem-
bling particulars themselves (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, p. 115).4
Thus Socrates and Plato are the truthmakers of (3), Socrates and Ar-
istotle are the truthmakers of (4), and Plato and Aristotle are the
truthmakers of (5).5
As we shall see in §iii, some critics thought that it follows from
this that I am committed to giving propositions (6) and (7) the same
truthmakers:
(6) ?Socrates is white?
(7) ?Plato is white?
I shall argue below that it does not follow from what I said in the
book that (6) and (7) have the same truthmakers. But before doing
that, I shall concentrate on a different but related question, the ques-
4 Strictly speaking, this was not my answer, since in the book I took sentences to be truth-
bearers. But I now think that propositions are truthbearers, or at least the primary truth-
bearers. What I said in the book was that the truthmakers of sentences asserting
resemblance between two particulars are the resembling particulars themselves. And I
would have said the same of propositions asserting resemblance between two particulars
had I taken propositions to be truthbearers.
5 That Socrates and Plato are the truthmakers of (3) might seem to go against truthmaker
necessitarianism, the doctrine that truthmakers necessitate or entail the truths they make
true—a doctrine I accept. But given the way the resemblance nominalist endorses the claim
that Socrates and Plato are the truthmakers of (3), and given the way he interprets truth-
maker necessitarianism, there is no conflict between truthmaker necessitarianism and say-
ing that Socrates and Plato are the truthmakers of (3). For the resemblance nominalist takes
particulars to be world-bound, that is, he takes particulars to exist in no more than one pos-
sible world. And the correct interpretation of truthmaker necessitarianism, given the ontol-
ogy of modal realism to which the resemblance nominalist is committed, is that in every
possible world in which the truthmakers exist, the proposition they make true is true. But
then, since Socrates and Plato exist in only one world and in it they resemble each other,
they necessitate (3). For discussion see Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002, pp. 34, 39–40, 99–104,
117–18), Bird (2003) and Rodriguez-Pereyra (2003).
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tion about the truthmakers of (1) and (2). For it seems as if I am
committed to the view that they have the same truthmakers, namely
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. And this seems to be implausible. Not
because different propositions cannot have the same truthmakers,
which is false, but because the role of Aristotle as truthmaker of
these propositions seems intuitively to be different. Whatever the
specific account one gives of what makes (1) and (2) true, it is rea-
sonable to think that that Aristotle pairs up with Socrates to make
(1) true, while he pairs up with Plato to make (2) true. Thus it would
be better for resemblance nominalism if it could provide different ac-
counts of what makes (1) true and what makes (2) true that respect
this intuition about the different role of Aristotle (and consequently
of Socrates and Plato) as a truthmaker for these propositions.
Thus in §ii I shall develop a philosophically interesting way in
which the resemblance nominalist can tell different truthmaking sto-
ries about (1) and (2). More specifically, I shall develop a view ac-
cording to which although (1) and (2) have the same truthmakers,
these truthmakers make them true in different ways. In §iii I shall
discuss Cian Dorr’s and Jessica Wilson’s objections to my account of
the truthmakers of (6) and (7), and I shall then use the view devel-
oped in §ii to account for the truthmakers of (6) and (7).
II
There is at least one straightforward way of giving (1) and (2) differ-
ent truthmakers. One can maintain, for instance, that the truthmak-
ers of (3), (4) and (5) are the resemblance facts [Socrates resembles
Plato], [Socrates resembles Aristotle] and [Plato resembles
Aristotle], respectively. Then what makes (1) true are the facts [Soc-
rates resembles Plato] and [Socrates resembles Aristotle], and what
makes (2) true are the facts [Socrates resembles Plato] and [Plato re-
sembles Aristotle]. This is a viable and interesting way of accounting
for the truthmakers of (1)–(5), but I am here interested in exploring
a view according to which the truthmakers of (3), (4) and (5) are
Socrates and Plato, Socrates and Aristotle, and Plato and Aristotle
respectively, but in which these three particulars make (1) and (2)
true in different ways.
How can different propositions have the same truthmakers but be
made true by them in different ways? Consider propositions (8) and
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(9), and take them to be true:
(8) ?P - Q?
(9) ?P . Q?
Suppose, for the sake of illustration, that propositions are made true
by facts, and that there are such facts as [P] and [Q]. If so, it would
be standard to say that the disjunction is individually or separately
made true by [P] and by [Q], while the conjunction is jointly made
true by [P] and [Q].6
Do these propositions have the same truthmakers? Yes, they do.
Both are true in virtue of the facts [P] and [Q]. For the fact that the
conjunction has collective or joint truthmakers does not mean that
it has an individual truthmaker of a rarefied kind. That the conjunc-
tion is jointly made true by [P] and [Q] does not mean that it bears
the true in virtue of relation to some individual entity that somehow
subsumes both [P] and [Q]; it means that it bears the true in virtue
of relation to [P] and [Q] collectively without bearing it to both of
them individually.7
Thus (8) and (9) have the same truthmakers. For the things to
which the disjunction is related by the truthmaking relation are the
same as the things to which the conjunction is related by the truth-
making relation. But there is a difference in how those things are re-
lated by the truthmaking relation to those two propositions. The
truthmaking relation relates [P] and [Q] individually to the disjunc-
tion, but it relates them collectively to the conjunction. That is why
the disjunction is individually or separately made true by the facts
[P] and [Q] but the conjunction is collectively made true by the facts
[P] and [Q]. This is simply a difference in how these facts enter the
6 In this section I am trying to develop a resemblance nominalist way of accounting for what
makes (1) and (2) true that does not invoke facts. But I shall introduce, explain and illus-
trate the position by using facts. This is simply because since I will use unstructured propo-
sitional variables in my examples of propositions, it simplifies exposition if I use fact
variables in my examples of truthmakers. But I could have said, for instance, that while (8)
is individually made true by Socrates and Plato, (9) is collectively made true by Socrates and
Plato. The point I am trying to illustrate by means of facts is that it is standard to say that
disjunctions are individually made true by the truthmakers of their disjuncts, and conjunc-
tions are collectively made true by the truthmakers of their conjuncts (see, for example,
Mulligan, Simons and Smith 1984, pp. 314–15). Every point I make using facts in this sec-
tion can also be made without them.
7 This would be true even if one treats ‘[P] and [Q]’ as a plural term, for such a term, if it is gen-
uinely plural and not a mere string of singular terms, does not stand for any singular object,
but for the two things [P] and [Q]. See, for instance, Oliver and Smiley (2004, p. 642).
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truthmaking relation, and so the fact that the conjunction has joint
or collective truthmakers does not bring in any additional ontologi-
cal commitments.
This difference in how [P] and [Q] make propositions (8) and (9)
true is what I intend to capture by saying that (8) and (9) are made
true by the same truthmakers in different ways. Thus two proposi-
tions can have the same truthmakers while being made true by them
in different ways, i.e. individually or collectively.
Now, in the same way that the same entities can be related to
some other entity individually or collectively, the same entities can
be related to some other entity in different groups without all of
them being collectively related to the entity in question and without
each of them being individually related to the thing in question. For
instance a tree might be surrounded by a and b on the one hand and
by c and d on the other, without being surrounded by the four of
them. This might happen if a and b surround it at one time, and c
and d surround it at a different time. But it might also happen if a
and b, while surrounding the tree, are themselves surrounded by c
and d. And it might also happen if c and d, while surrounding the
tree, are standing on top of a and b, which are also surrounding the
tree in question. We might say that in these cases these things are re-
lated to the tree groupally without being related to it either collec-
tively or individually. None of the things a, b, c and d individually
surround the tree, nor do they do it collectively, yet they do it
groupally: a and b on the one hand, and c and d on the other.
Consider (10) and assume that both disjuncts are true:
(10) ??P . Q ? - ?R . S??
If one thinks that the truthmakers of a disjunction are the truthmak-
ers of its disjuncts separately and the truthmakers of a conjunction
are the truthmakers of its conjuncts collectively, then (10) is made
true by the facts [P] and [Q] on the one hand and by the facts [R]
and [S] on the other, but it is not made true collectively by the facts
[P], [Q], [R] and [S]. We might say that (10) is made true groupally
by [P], [Q], [R] and [S]: it is made true by [P] and [Q] on the one
hand and it is made true by [R] and [S] on the other hand.
Something I would like to emphasize about these cases is that al-
though a thing can be surrounded groupally by some things, or be
made true groupally by some things, this does not mean that there
are any things involved in the situation other than those things to
NOMINALISM, CONJUNCTIONS AND TRUTHMAKERS 27
©2013 The Aristotelian Society
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cxiii, Part 1
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2013.00343.x
which the thing is related groupally. In the case of disjunction (10),
saying that it is made true by the facts [P] and [Q] and also made
true by the facts [R] and [S] is not saying that there is any entity
over and above the facts [P], [Q], [R] and [S]. In particular, by say-
ing that certain things are groupally related to another I do not
mean to reify any groups—whether or not groups are entities, the
things themselves bear the relation in this case, not any groups
formed by them.
Now there are two ways in which some things can be related
groupally to another thing. It might be that the groups bear the rela-
tion to the relatum separately, or it might be that the groups bear
the relation to the relatum collectively. The cases I have described so
far are such that the entities that bear the relation groupally bear it
separately groupally. That is, a, b, c and d are such that they sur-
round the tree groupally because a and b surround it and c and d
surround it, but the tree is surrounded by each group separately. In
this case the tree bears the relation of being surrounded by to each
group separately.8 The same is true in the case of disjunction (10):
the proposition bears the true in virtue of relation to the facts [P]
and [Q] on the one hand and it bears it to the facts [R] and [S] on
the other hand. The two groups of facts make the proposition true
separately.
Now some things might bear some relations to other things col-
lectively groupally. Consider (11) and (12), and assume, for the sake
of the argument, not only that they are both true but that they are
two distinct propositions:
(11) ??P . Q? . ?R . S??
(12) ?P . Q . R . S?
It is plausible to think that the distinction between (11) and (12) is
reflected at the level of truthmaking. In effect, it is plausible to think
that although (12) is made true collectively by the facts [P], [Q], [R]
and [S], this is not so in the case of (11). For (11) is made true by the
facts [P] and [Q] on the one hand, together with the facts [R] and
[S] on the other hand. Thus neither the facts [P] and [Q], nor the
8 Although here, and occasionally elsewhere, I speak of the group as being one of the relata,
this is just a manner of speaking to avoid cumbersome expression. What surrounds the tree
is not a group of things, understood as an entity over and above the things that are sup-
posed to be in the group, but these things themselves.
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facts [R] and [S] make (11) true separately: to make (11) true the
two groups together are needed. In this case I shall say that (11) is
made true by the facts [P], [Q], [R] and [S] collectively groupally.
That the facts [P], [Q], [R], and [S] make a certain proposition
true collectively groupally does not impose any additional ontologi-
cal commitments with respect to those of having [P], [Q], [R] and [S]
making a certain proposition true collectively. That is, the ontology
required to account for what makes proposition (11) true is the same
as that required to account for what makes proposition (12) true.
The same phenomenon of some things bearing a relation to an-
other collectively groupally can be observed in relations other than
truthmaking. Consider the relation of being surrounded twice by. It
might be that our tree bears the relation of being surrounded twice
by to a, b, c and d—but not because any one of them individually
surrounded it twice, nor because the four of them collectively sur-
rounded it twice, but because a and b surrounded it at one time and
c and d at another time, or because while surrouding it, c and d
were standing on top of a and b, or because, while surrounding it, a
and b were surrounded by c and d. In any of these cases the tree is
surrounded twice by a, b, c and d collectively groupally.
Back to resemblance nominalism. According to the line of
thought I am trying to develop here, to account for the truthmakers
of (1) and (2) one does not need to postulate any entities other than
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. But this does not mean that each one
of them individually makes those propositions true; nor does it
mean that the three of them collectively make them true. What hap-
pens is that they make them collectively groupally true. That is, (1)
is made true by Socrates and Plato together, together with Socrates
and Aristotle together. And (2) is made true by Socrates and Plato
together, together with Plato and Aristotle together.
This makes it possible to say that although the entities that make
propositions (1) and (2) true are the same, they make them true in
different ways. The entities that make them true are Socrates, Plato
and Aristotle. But those propositions are made true by these entities
grouped in different ways. (1) is made true by Socrates and Plato to-
gether, together with Socrates and Aristotle together, while (2) is
made true by Socrates and Plato together, together with Plato and
Aristotle together. The ontology is the same in both cases, but the
way in which the entities enter the truthmaking relation is different.
Thus there is a way in which resemblance nominalism can account
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for the truthmakers of propositions (1) and (2) without postulating
facts, and invoking only resembling particulars.9
The truthmaking predicate is multigrade in its first place, since
any number of things can make a proposition true. Thus any
number of arguments can occupy the first place of ‘… make …
true’. These arguments can be either singular or plural, since some-
times some things collectively make a proposition true without indi-
vidually making it true.
That some entities can collectively make a proposition true with-
out individually making it true means that the truthmaking predi-
cate is non-distributive—at least with respect to the arguments
occupying its first place. A predicate F is said to be distributive if, in
virtue of the meaning of F, whenever some things are F, each one of
them is F (McKay 2006, p. 5). Thus ‘… make … true’ is non-distrib-
utive, since [X] and [Y] might be such that they make ?P? true with-
out either being such that it makes it true. The non-distributivity of
a predicate need not be thought to bring in additional commitments.
Thus the fact that Socrates and Plato collectively or jointly make?Socrates resembles Plato? true brings no additional ontological
commitments over and above those to Socrates and Plato.
Let me introduce a new feature of predicates. I define F as an as-
sociative predicate if and only if, in virtue of the meaning of F,
whenever some things are collectively groupally F, then they are col-
lectively F. Thus if F is an associative predicate then if some things X
and some things Y are collectively F then for any things Z, such that
something is one of the Zs if and only if it is one of the Xs or one of
the Ys, the Zs are collectively F. ‘… move the piano’ is an associative
predicate. It is in virtue of the meaning of ‘… move the piano’ that if
a and b, together with c and d, move the piano, then a, b, c and d
together move the piano.
What I have been arguing is that the truthmaking predicate is not
9 This view does not invoke sets to account for what makes (1) and (2) true. But resem-
blance nominalism, as developed in Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002), is committed to sets—this is
part of what makes it possible to solve the imperfect community difficulty. Is the appeal to
pluralities involved in this way of accounting for what makes (1) and (2) true sufficient for
the resemblance nominalist to reject sets? Probably not if the resemblance nominalist still
adheres to the idea that resemblance is a dyadic relation. For unless one admits sets (pairs,
specifically) as relata of the relevant resemblance relation, I do not see how one is going to
solve the imperfect community difficulty and related problems. In §iii I shall presuppose
that resemblance nominalism needs sets (pairs) to solve the imperfect community difficulty.
But whether this is so is worth exploring by those willing to continue developing resem-
blance nominalism.
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only non-distributive but also non-associative. The truthmaking
predicate is non-vacuously non-associative since, for instance, Soc-
rates and Plato (the Xs) and Socrates and Aristotle (the Ys) jointly
or collectively make proposition (1) true, but Socrates, Plato and
Aristotle (the Zs) do not collectively make it true.
Truthmaking is not the only non-associative predicate. Another
such predicate is ‘… form two circles’. Suppose a, b, c and d are all
of semi-circular shape. Suppose that a and b are arranged so as to
form a circle, and c and d are arranged so as to form another circle.
Then a and b, together with c and d, form two circles. But it does
not follow that a, b, c and d collectively form two circles, since they
do not collectively form any circles at all.
That the truthmaking predicate is non-associative shows that the
truthmaking predicate might sometimes be understood as taking a
superplural argument in the first place. ‘Socrates and Plato together
with Socrates and Aristotle’ is a superplural expression, since it is a
plural expression—it refers to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle—that
stands to the plural expressions ‘Socrates and Plato’ and ‘Socrates
and Aristotle’ as these stand to the singular terms ‘Socrates’ and
‘Plato’ and ‘Socrates’ and ‘Aristotle’ respectively. Thus the truth-
making predicate can sometimes function as a superplural predicate
(cf. Linnebo and Nicolas 2008, p. 193).10
I am not saying that the truthmaking predicate always takes su-
perplural arguments. I am saying that it can take such arguments.
But sometimes it takes plural arguments, for instance, when we say
that Socrates and Plato make ?Socrates resembles Plato? true, mean-
ing that they make it true collectively. And sometimes it takes singu-
lar arguments, for instance, when we say that Socrates makes?Socrates exists? true.11
10 The considerations presented in this paper generalize, and should therefore support the
view that the truthmaking predicate can take plural predicates of any order (possibly
including infinite order), that is, not just superplural arguments, but also super-superplural
arguments, and so on. It should also be noted that they also support the view that the truth-
making predicate takes plural predicates of ‘mixed order’. For instance, what makes?Aristotle exists and Socrates resembles Plato? true is Aristotle together with Socrates and
Plato together. ‘Aristotle together with Socrates and Plato together’ (or ‘Aristotle and (Soc-
rates and Plato)’) would be a superplural expression of ‘mixed order’, since it is obtained
combining a singular and a first-order plural expression. I am indebted to Øystein Linnebo
for alerting me to the points in this footnote.
11 Some might be tempted to say that sometimes it takes, not a plural argument, but a plu-
rality of singular arguments, as when we say that Socrates and Plato make ?Someone exists?
true, meaning that they make it true separately or individually. I think this is right, but the
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Note that the line developed here rejects the thought that, in gen-
eral, a conjunction is collectively made true by the truthmakers of
its conjuncts. For sometimes a conjunction is made true collectively
groupally by the truthmakers of its conjuncts. Thus it might be
thought that this line of thought is not in the spirit of truthmaker
theory, and that it is an ad hoc innovation made just to solve a diffi-
culty. But if the possibility of many things collectively but not indi-
vidually making true a proposition is in the spirit of truthmaker
theory, then the possibility of many entities collectively groupally
making true a proposition but not collectively making it true is a
natural extension of the original idea. Furthermore, the fact that
there are relations other than truthmaking that can be borne collec-
tively groupally without being borne collectively should help to dis-
pel the sense that there is any ad hoc move here.
III
In the previous section I proposed a resemblance nominalist view
about what makes conjunctions (1) and (2) true. In this section I shall
apply that view to (6) and (7). But before doing that, I shall discuss ob-
jections by Cian Dorr (2005) and Jessica Wilson (2006) to what I said
about the truthmakers of (6) and (7) in Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002).
There I committed myself to the view that a proposition like? a resembles b, …, and a resembles z? is made true by a, b, …, and
z, and I claimed that the facts [Socrates is white] and [Plato is white]
are the facts [Socrates resembles Plato and Socrates resembles
Aristotle] and [Plato resembles Socrates and Plato resembles
difference between the case in which it takes a plural argument and the case in which it
takes a plurality of singular arguments is merely syntactic: it is the difference between tak-
ing a semantically plural syntactic unity and taking a plurality of semantically singular syn-
tactic unities. The difference does not seem to be very significant, and none of the main
points in the paper would be affected if it were the case that the truthmaking predicate
took plural arguments but not pluralities of singular ones. It should also be noted that we
can say that Socrates and Plato collectively make ?Socrates resembles Plato? true using the
singular names ‘Socrates’ and ‘Plato’, and we can also say that Socrates and Plato individu-
ally make ?Someone exists? true using the plural name ‘Socrates and Plato’. In a similar
vein, some might be tempted to think that the truthmaking predicate takes, not superplural
arguments, but pluralities of plural arguments. Again, I think the difference is merely syn-
tactic: it is the difference between taking a semantically superplural syntactic unity and tak-
ing a plurality of semantically plural syntactic unities. I think this difference is not
significant for the points of this paper.
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Aristotle].12 Dorr (2005) and Wilson (2006) objected that I violated
the desideratum that propositions like ?a is F? and ?b is F?, that is,
propositions like (6) and (7), have different truthmakers. Here is
what Wilson says:
[I]t is plausible that the truthmakers of some claims are jointly the
truthmakers for the conjunctions of these claims. Hence if property at-
tributions are conjunctions of resemblance claims, and the truthmak-
ers of resemblance claims are just the resembling particulars, then the
truthmakers for both ‘a is F’ and ‘b is F’ will be just a, b, …, and z.
Rodriguez-Pereyra’s account thus faces the same difficulty as the (sim-
pler) ostrich view he rejects. (Wilson 2006, p. 242)
And this is what Dorr says:
I found Rodriguez-Pereyra’s treatment of truthmaking rather perplex-
ing. On the one hand, he is happy to admit conjunctive facts and facts
about resemblance. On the other hand, he maintains that conjunctions
are jointly made true by the truthmakers of their conjuncts, and that
truths about resemblance are jointly made true by the two resembling
particulars. Given that the fact that a is F turns out on Rodriguez-
Pereyra’s account to be a conjunctive fact, this seems to entail that the
truth that a is F is jointly made true by all the F particulars …; exactly
the same things jointly make it true that anything else is F. But whatev-
er reason Rodriguez-Pereyra might have for holding that the truth that
a is F must have different truthmakers from the truth that a is G, one
would think that there should be at least as much reason to hold that
the truth that a is F must have different truthmakers from the truth
that b is F, when a  b. (Dorr 2005, pp. 460–1)
As I said, the point of both objections is that I have violated the de-
sideratum that propositions like ? a is F? and ?b is F? have different
truthmakers. But the two objections are subtly different. I think that
Dorr represents my position in the book accurately, or more accu-
rately than Wilson does, but he is mistaken that I have (or seem to
have) violated the desideratum that what makes ? a is F? true is not
12 That facts like [Socrates is white] are conjunctive facts whose conjuncts are resemblance
facts is asserted in Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002, pp. 86–7) (for more on what I said about facts,
see note 3 above). Although I never explicitly affirmed that a proposition like ?a resembles
b, …, and a resembles z? is made true by a, b, …, and z, I was implicitly committed to it,
since I maintained that resemblance propositions are made true by the two resembling par-
ticulars (p. 115) and that conjunctions are jointly (collectively) made true by the truthmak-
ers of their conjuncts (pp. 38–9).
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what makes ?b is F? true. I think that Wilson misrepresents me, but
if I had said what she takes me to have said, she would have been
right.
The difference between the two objections will become clear later
on. Consider Dorr’s objection first. Given what he says in the pas-
sage above, he is attributing to me the idea that if a, b, …, and z are
all the F particulars, then ?a resembles b, …, and a resembles z? is
made true by a, b, …, and z. This attribution is correct, given what I
said in my book. And he thinks that from these ideas plus the idea
that [a is F] is a conjunctive fact whose conjuncts are resemblance
facts, it follows (or seems to follow) that the truth ?a is F? is made
true by a, b, …, and z. But since ?b resembles a, …, and b resembles
z? is also made true by a, b, …, and z, these things also make ?b is F?
true; therefore ? a is F? and ?b is F? have the same truthmakers. The
following inference is essential to Dorr’s argument:
(a) [a is F] = [a resembles b, …, and a resembles z]
(b) ? a resembles b, …, and a resembles z? is made true by a, b,
…, and z.
Therefore,
(c) ? a is F? is made true by a, b, …, and z.
But (c) does not follow from (a) and (b), and therefore that ? a is F?
and ?b is F? have the same truthmakers does not follow from (a)
and (b). The reason why (c) does not follow from those premisses is
that ? a is F? and ? a resembles b, …, and a resembles z? are different
truths, and [a is F] is a conjunctive fact, not the totality of F particu-
lars. Thus Dorr has not shown that what I said in Rodriguez-
Pereyra (2002) violates the desideratum that what makes ? a is F?
true is not what makes ?b is F? true.
But here is an argument whose conclusion is that ? a is F? is made
true by a, b, …, and z:
(b) ? a resembles b, …, and a resembles z? is made true by a, b,
…, and z.
(d) ? a is F? is made true by [a resembles b, …, and a resembles
z].
GONZALO RODRIGUEZ-PEREYRA34
©2013 The Aristotelian Society
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cxiii, Part 1
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2013.00343.x
(e) If x1, …, xn make ?P? true, and [P] makes ?Q? true, then
x1, …, xn make ?Q? true.
Therefore,
(c) ? a is F? is made true by a, b, …, and z.
The mechanics of this argument are obvious. But the problem is that
(e) is false. For suppose that ?P . Q? is true in virtue of [P] and [Q]
together, that is, [P] and [Q] jointly make ?P . Q? true. And sup-
pose, furthermore, that there is a conjunctive fact [P . Q]. Then?There is a conjunctive fact? is made true by [P . Q]. But ?There is a
conjunctive fact? is not made true by [P] and [Q] together.
Wilson objects to my example. She says that it is implausible that
[P] and [Q] jointly make ?P . Q? true but do not make ?There is a
conjunctive fact? true. She adds, ‘Whatever makes “P . Q” true also
makes true “There is a conjunctive fact”, just as whatever makes
true a specific existential claim also makes true “Something exists”’
(Wilson 2006, p. 242 n.4). But what she finds implausible is, in fact,
plausible. For since some facts together are not a conjunctive fact,
given that some facts together are the truthmakers of a proposition
like ?P . Q?, it seems clear that the truthmakers of ?P . Q? need
not be the truthmakers of ?There is a conjunctive fact?. To make?There is a conjunctive fact? true we need an extra conjunctive fact,
over and above [P] and [Q] together. (And, by the way, ‘P . Q’ is
not related to ‘There is a conjunctive fact’ as specific existential
claims are related to ‘Something exists’. That is, ‘P . Q’ is not an in-
stance of ‘There is a conjunctive fact’. An instance of it is, for exam-
ple, ‘[P . Q] is a conjunctive fact’.)
But note that even if (e) were true, all that would follow is that
the white particulars would be truthmakers of both ?Socrates is
white? and ?Plato is white?. This does not mean that these proposi-
tions have the same truthmakers, only that they share some, since
[Socrates is white] would be a truthmaker of ?Socrates is white? but
not of ?Plato is white?, and [Plato is white] would be a truthmaker
of ?Plato is white? but not of ?Socrates is white?. The facts [Socrates
is white] and [Plato is white] are conjunctive facts whose conjuncts
are resemblance facts. But although the constituents of all the ‘basic’
resemblance facts whose conjunction forms [Socrates is white] are
the same as the constituents of the ‘basic’ resemblance facts whose
conjunction forms [Plato is white], the constituents of [Socrates is
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white] are not the same as the constituents of [Plato is white], for, to
give just an example, [Socrates resembles Aristotle] is a constituent
of [Socrates is white] but not of [Plato is white].13
As I said, Wilson’s objection is different from Dorr’s. Wilson
claims that if propositions attributing a property to a particular are
conjunctive propositions whose conjuncts are resemblance proposi-
tions, then since the truthmakers of conjunctions are the truthmak-
ers of their conjuncts, it follows that ? a is F? and ?b is F? have the
same truthmakers, since both propositions are jointly made true by
all the F particulars. She is right that this is what follows from such
13 Here are two other arguments whose conclusion is (c):
(a) [a is F] = [a resembles b, …, and a resembles z]
(b) ? a resembles b,…, and a resembles z? is made true by a, b, …, and z.
(f) ?[P] exists? and ?P? have the same truthmakers.
Therefore,
(c) ? a is F? is made true by a, b, …, and z.
(b) and (f) entail that ?[a resembles b, …, and a resembles z] exists? is made true by a, b,
…, and z. Given (a), ?[a is F] exists? and ?[a resembles b, …, and a resembles z] exists?
have the same truthmakers, and so ?[a is F] exists? is made true by a, b, …, and z. By (f), it
follows (c), that ? a is F? is made true by a, b, …, and z.
But I can see no reason to accept (f). Suppose both ?[P . Q] exists? and ?P . Q? are
true. It is not implausible to maintain that while the latter is made true separately by
[P . Q] on the one hand and by [P] and [Q] together on the other, the former is made true
only by [P . Q], for it is not implausible to maintain that the only truthmaker of a propo-
sition asserting existence of an entity is the entity whose existence it asserts. Even if the ex-
istence of [P . Q] entails that of [P] and [Q], the latter are not the truthmakers of ?[P . Q
exists]?, in the same way in which my parts are not the truthmakers of ?I exist?.
This is the second argument:
(a) [a is F] = [a resembles b, …, and a resembles z]
(g) Nothing but a, b, …, z makes ? a resembles b, …, and a resembles z? true.
(h) For every ?P? with a truthmaker, if [P] exists, then [P] makes ?P? true.
Therefore,
(c) ? a is F? is made true by a, b, …, and z.
The argument would be that, by (h), [a resembles b, …, and a resembles z] makes ? a re-
sembles b, …, and a resembles z? true. But then, by (g), [a resembles b, …, and a resembles
z] is the totality of a, b, …, and z, and hence, by (a), the totality of a, b, …, and z is [a is F].
By (h), [a is F] makes ? a is F? true and so a, b, …, and z make ? a is F? true.
But I see no reason to accept (g). Many propositions have more than one independent
truthmaker. Disjunctions are one case, but they need not be the only case. As I have just
said, if [P . Q] exists, it is not implausible that ?P . Q? is separately made true by [P . Q]
on the one hand, and by [P] and [Q] together on the other hand. And (h) is not sacrosanct
either. Some people maintain that there are truths that have no truthmakers (Milne 2005,
Simons 2005). Why couldn’t one maintain that there are facts that do not make true any-
thing? Such a position would even be consistent with truthmaker maximalism, which claims
that every truth has a truthmaker. I am not saying that (h) is false. I am saying that it is not
evident, and there might be reasons to reject it; but in any case I am prepared to reject (g).
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a supposition. But I never claimed that propositions like ? a is F? are
in fact conjunctive propositions whose conjuncts are resemblance
propositions. So her criticism does not apply to me. Thus Wilson
has not shown that what I said in Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002) violates
the desideratum that what makes ? a is F? true is not what makes ?b
is F? true.
But although the theory presented and developed in Rodriguez-
Pereyra (2002) did not violate the desideratum that what makes ? a
is F? true is not what makes ?b is F? true, it accounted for their
truthmakers in terms of conjunctive facts whose conjuncts are re-
semblance facts. The theory developed in the previous section seems
to allow the resemblance nominalist to account for what makes
propositions like ? a is F? true without appealing to facts, and so, in
a sense, simplifies the theory. For it seems that the resemblance
nominalist can say that what makes ? a is F? true is what makes ? a
resembles b, …, and a resembles z? true, where a, b, …, and z are all
the F particulars. And so what makes (6) and (7) true is what makes
(1) and (2) true. And although (1) and (2) have the same truthmak-
ers, this is not objectionable, since it is not the case that what ac-
counts for the truth of (1) is what accounts for the truth of (2): they
have the same truthmakers, but they are made true by them in dif-
ferent ways. Thus (6) and (7) have the same truthmakers, but they
are made true by them in different ways.
But there is a simplification in what I have just said. The truthmak-
ers of (6) and (7) cannot be the truthmakers of (1) and (2). This is be-
cause that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are the three white
particulars is something more than merely the fact that they pairwise
resemble each other, since they could pairwise resemble each other
without thereby sharing any characteristic. In that case they would
form an imperfect community. As I argued in Resemblance Nominal-
ism, what makes them form a perfect community, that is, a class of
things all of which share a certain characteristic, is that not only do
they resemble each other, but their pairs resemble each other as well
(Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, pp. 162–72). That is, what makes Socra-
tes, Plato and Aristotle form a perfect community is that they resem-
ble each other pairwise and so do {Socrates, Plato}, {Socrates,
Aristotle} and {Plato, Aristotle}. So what makes (6) true is Socrates
and Plato together, together with Socrates and Aristotle together, to-
gether with {Socrates, Plato} and {Socrates, Aristotle} together, to-
gether with {Socrates, Plato} and {Plato, Aristotle} together, together
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with {Socrates, Aristotle} and {Plato, Aristotle} together.14 But (7) is
made true by Socrates and Plato together, together with Plato and Ar-
istotle together, together with {Socrates, Plato} and {Socrates, Aristo-
tle} together, together with {Socrates, Plato} and {Plato, Aristotle}
together, together with {Socrates, Aristotle} and {Plato, Aristotle} to-
gether.15 So (6) and (7), on this view, have the same truthmakers, but
they collectively groupally make (6) true in one way and collectively
groupally make (7) true in another way. This means that what ac-
counts for the truth of (6) and (7) is not the same.
IV
To conclude, resemblance nominalism can give different accounts of
the truth of (1) and (2) without using facts of resemblance. This re-
quires taking those two propositions to have the same truth-makers,
but to be made true by them in different ways. That is, Socrates,
Plato and Aristotle are the truthmakers of both (1) and (2), but they
collectively groupally make (1) true in one way, and collectively
groupally make (2) true in another way. And, as we saw in the last
section, the resemblance nominalist can also give different accounts
of the truth of (6) and (7) without using facts of resemblance. In this
case, the truthmakers are in both cases Socrates, Plato, Aristotle,
{Socrates, Plato}, {Socrates, Aristotle}, and {Plato, Aristotle}. But
they collectively groupally make (6) true in one way, and collectively
groupally make (7) true in another way.16
Oriel College
University of Oxford
Oxford ox1 4ew
uk
14 Assuming, of course, the fiction that Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are the only three white
particulars.
15 Thus although in Resemblance Nominalism I did not take the fact that Socrates is white
to be the conjunctive fact [Socrates resembles Plato and Socrates resembles Aristotle and
{Socrates, Plato} resembles {Socrates, Aristotle} and {Socrates, Plato} resembles {Plato, Aris-
totle} and {Socrates, Aristotle} resembles {Plato, Aristotle}], the elements and reasons to do
so were present in the book.
16 I am grateful to audiences in Buenos Aires, Curitiba, Edinburgh, Geneva, Lima, Oxford,
Padova, Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Villa Giardino, and at the Aristotelian Society in
London for helpful comments on previous versions of this paper.
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